Episode 72 Continuation of the Account on El Raisuni and Northern Resistance by Al-Haji Al-Bouayachi
- The Resistance of the Jebala Tribes and El Raisuli Against Spanish Occupation
...which was an important center for the gathering of the Mujahideen who threatened the city of Ceuta. Therefore, the Spanish initiated an agreement with El Raisuli to disperse the Mujahideen from this center. However, the Spanish launched a fierce attack, participating with several columns, while El Raisuli undertook to resist and fight them—a matter that paved the way for the Spanish army to reach this gathering and occupy the village of Al-Bayyut on June 19, 1916. Despite this, when it found a favorable opportunity to press the Spaniards, it turned against them. This fabricated myth is unmatched in the history of Ceuta. In short, what was written about the Jibali liberation movements and their heroes—mentioning figures like the Faqih Al-Majlawi, the leader Muhammad Al-Mawden, and Al-Younisi—is all inverted and flawed accounts, which we have replaced with what we have verified and recorded in the chest of this book.
As for his statement: "The Spanish army found no breathing room until Spain resorted to buying the consciences..."—meaning some of the people of Anjra, Al-Hawz, and Ghomara through the agents of Tetouan and Tangier to spread Spanish policy among those leaders who acted to make these tribes turn their backs on the Mujahideen and achieve what they wanted from the betrayal of those tribes, with the exception of some of their leaders such as: Sidi Ahmad Al-Tawil Al-Hawzi, الطالب محمد بن حازم الأنجري (Talib Muhammad bin Hazim Al-Anjuri), السيد العربي ابن الخيضر الأنجري (Al-Sayyid al-Arabi ibn al-Khidr al-Anjuri), الحاج علي الخمال (Al-Hajj Ali al-Khamal), and الطالب محمد بن حمان (Talib Muhammad bin Hamman), known as Fhilou from Wadrass. After matters settled in the Anjra tribe, it was occupied by General Castro Giron and Colonel Carias. By occupying it, they gained an excellent military position, and communication between Tetouan and Tangier became possible via the coastal road of the Strait of Gibraltar between Ceuta and Tangier. Then the Spanish armies moved to open the Al-Fundaq road, where leader El Raisuli resides and stations his Mahalla (forces). The Spanish armies left their base at Hojrat al-Nahl, passing their base at the Red Aqba, adjacent to the Fahsiyin decorations, the birthplace of Raisuli the First. Another force left its base at Al-Manar, adjacent to the city of Tangier, and another from its base at Qasr al-Saghir, occupying the Anjra tribe on the shores of the Strait. These armies joined the Mujahideen in the plains of the tribes of Wadrass and Anjra, and battles continued for several months with the participation of aircraft squadrons, heavy artillery, and light weapons. The Mujahideen stood firm, performed valiantly, and achieved clear victories before the enemy managed to occupy Jabal al-Rawdah at night and set up fortifications there to link up with the occupation of Fندق عين الجديدة (Ain Al-Fundaq New), the center of the bond for Sharif El Raisuli.
- Chapters of Moroccan Resistance: El Raisuli and the Northern Battles
...the gathering of the Mujahideen with rifle fire, directing nationalist fire at them, forcing them to leave those fortifications after a large number of them were annihilated. A few days later, they prepared other mixed armies of Spanish regular mercenaries and attacked the Mujahideen groups, directing nationalist fire at them as they had done the first time, forcing them to leave at night as well. This was repeated when they occupied Al-Rawdah and withdrew about four times, all while battles continued against the Mujahideen from the men of the tribes, until some mercenaries of the Anjra and Wadrass tribes betrayed the Mujahideen, and El Raisuli camped as a camp at Majaz Al-Fundaq. Then fierce battles took place facing the Mujahideen, and the losses in lives around Al-Fundaq were hair-raising. The Spanish army retreated to its bases from where it had set out to the battlefield, then stopped at Hojrat al-Nahl to rest, and the war froze for a year with skirmishes scattered here and there. The leadership of the Mujahideen, distributed alongside Leader El Raisuli at Al-Fundaq Al-Jadida, was as follows: Leader Hamid Walad Hmidou Al-Kharraz was stationed next to the leader El Raisuli, while the fierce fighting took place between the Mujahideen and the Spanish army, with the rest of the front remaining under four commands: command led by Leader Muhammad bin Hazim Al-Anjuri, command led by Al-Sayyid Abd al-Salam Al-Harrami, command led by Leader Sidi Ahmad al-Tawil al-Hawzi, and command led by Leader Sidi al-Arabi bin Halima al-Yidri.
During this period, a relief force of eight hundred Mujahideen arrived from the Rif, commissioned in the name of Sharif El Raisuli by Sharif Sidi Hmidou Al-Wazzani, who was residing among the Jibala tribes. The consequences of this relief force were disastrous, as it is rumored that the Sultan of Jihad did not order it, and the professor Al-Arabi Al-Luh spoke about its failure in his book, where he participated in this relief, noting that the failure of this relief was the improvisation that characterizes the Maghrebi mentality. It is noticeable in the failure of this relief that the men of the Rif left for the land of the Rif before doing anything, and the distance between them and the combat positions was a major obstacle between them, as they first had to know that the distance separating them from their country and their people is weak in terms of material. How can victories be achieved in distant lands while they are away from them to see how the war is being conducted, and they are sent by their leaders to contact Sharif El Raisuli and test him regarding his continuous capabilities and uninterrupted communication? Then they would connect with the leader Sharif El Raisuli and test him regarding his military capabilities and equipment, and whether he was able to supply them with food and military equipment, considering whether this war...
- The Struggle for Independence: Spanish Campaigns and Tribal Defense in Northern Morocco
...is popular, and El Raisuli is one of them from the people; however, his leadership was active, lacking wealth or any military equipment, so that he could undertake the burdens of distant relief far from his country. These are the reasons for failure, all of which are attributed to the relief being belated, its fighters improvising, and not returning to Leader El Raisuli. There is another mistake regarding the men of the relief as well, where they relied on the Jibali tribes—whom they knew to be weak—especially since the enemy seized agricultural lands belonging to the Banu Arus tribe in the lands of Arba'a Aiyacha and its surroundings, and the grain mill, and the grinding stone that the war revolved around in the valleys and farms. During this period, many people were forced to eat plant roots due to the severe scarcity of markets, grains, and mills, standing idle because the peasant left it and raised his rifle to fight the occupier out of necessity to defend religion and the homeland.
El Raisuli's neglect of this relief is related to these circumstances, as its causes trace back to the improvisation, not bringing houses from their doors, and relying on starving tribes in their supplies, relying on the military equipment that El Raisuli would provide them with. Because they lost their hope in all of that, and nothing remained in their hands except Halhul Sidi Hady, they failed in their mission and returned the way they came without achieving anything except burning the village of Ain Ma'bad, which was forced to surrender as the enemy seized all its agricultural lands up to the doors of their homes, and even exceeded them to As-Sarija and Rorkat Al-Ghazal in the same year, 1338 AH corresponding to 1919 AD.
Sharif El Raisuli left the leadership of Ain Al-Fundaq Al-Jadida in the hands of the leader Sharif Walad Hmidou Al-Kharraz, and went to inspect other centers: in Arba'a Aiyacha, Thulatha Rissana in Al-Khalout, and especially the forward tribes such as the tribe of Banu Jarfot, Samata, Ahl Srif, Banu Yusuf, Banu Zakar, Warhona, and Rhiyawa. During this period, the enemy Silvestre was preparing for a large-scale campaign to open the Al-Fundaq Al-Jadida road, after requesting reinforcements from Spain, which actually arrived. The Spanish army occupied its centers in Wadi Lou, and some Ghomara tribes led by Al-Jabbas, who spread his policy in the Ghomara tribes, won over some of their tribes to the policy of occupation, so the Mujahideen rebelled and sided with the support of the Spanish army. During this period, General Berenguer took over the General Residency, distributing the occupation armies, occupying the center of Ain Al-Fundaq Al-Jadida after crushing battles, and then another army for the occupation of Jabal Rghiz. On June 25, 1920 AD, the Mujahideen center of Dar bin Quraish was occupied after crushing battles between them, in which many of the leaders of the Mujahideen were martyred, and then the enemy continued his advance...
- Behind the Scenes of the Riffian and Jibali Liberation Movement
...occupation of the land through the army and heavy and light artillery that shook the mountains and valleys with the assistance of air force squadrons that emptied their payloads on the villages, markets, and centers of the Mujahideen, and even on animals in pastures, in cooperation with the French army.
Furthermore, the General Resident directed a military campaign led by Colonel Silvestre towards the center of El Raisuli in the Banu Arus tribe, occupying the tribe of Banu Jarfot, Ahl Srif, and Banu Yusuf, then the external command of Tetouan was advanced and occupied Arba'a Banu Hassan. Thus, the rapid advance continued until it occupied the city of Chefchaouen and its surroundings from the mountains of Al-Akhmas and Ghomara. Then another campaign led by Colonel Silvestre advanced and participated with the French army in the occupation of the city of Wazzan. Other forces occupied the center of Qala in the tribe of Banu Yusuf, in addition to other forces that advanced into the tribe of Banu Yder, occupying Souq Thlatha Banu Yder. Then these forces advanced from all directions, occupying Banu Yusuf, Banu Yder, and Banu Jarfot, and occupying Souq Khamis Banu Arus, building their occupation centers on heights and strategic locations in preparation for the occupation of the center of the Mujahid Sharif El Raisuli in Tazroute on December 12, 1920 AD, to his saying: "And they agreed to attack Khardana"—meaning the French in the occupied zone of southern Morocco.
Since General Khardana knew in his own mind that this is the very truth, he did not hesitate to address El Raisuli very frankly in implementing the agreement with all strictness to facilitate the occupation of the tribes of Jbala, and organizing them so that they would disarm in a comprehensive manner to make his rule easier, or else he would be forced to use force. When the strictness reached this limit, El Raisuli knew that the ropes of deception had expired.
And his statement: "He did not content himself with congratulating him on the book, but went further by sending his eldest son Al-Bakr, accompanied by a delegation of prominent figures from the Jibala tribes to the city of Asilah..."
(Blockquote translated as part of the text analysis):
By God, look with me into the heart of these historical facts which we are spared from repeating what was previously recorded of truths that no two disagree on in this matter. Look at how El Raisuli describes the sincere Mujahid and the active subject of the self who does not soften nor waver, the cunning occupier who has no stability? As every pot leaks what is in it, as it becomes clear after that, serving his purposes and private interests that he does not build the history of his country, but rather presents it to rational men, and they weigh it with the scale of sound logic, then wait to reply to him with the beautiful praise that he tired himself with and placed between their hands in the service of science and the true historical thought in his country Morocco!!!
- El Raisuli and the Military Confrontations in Northern Morocco (1916–1920)
Primo de Rivera—who was behind General Sburou in the General Residency in Tetouan—a grand review for the Mujahideen arriving from the various tribes, who still carried their weapons on their shoulders. Thousands of young people who were trained to fight in the battles against the occupying enemy participated in the review, which angered the generals for what they sensed in the organization of the long-term review, both of them at the Ash center until the review ended. However, the author says: "The Spanish army participated with the people"—stating that El Raisuli is more deserving to sponsor the northern region from Ibn Abd el-Krim, and the truth is that he did not participate in the review. We have been spared from what we recorded of the historical facts that we narrated from trusted elders who lived through them in their youth, or those who lived through them in their time, which were filled with mutual study, whether from senior tribal men who fought their battles or Spanish men who were with them face to face. Therefore, giving them a correct study is impossible for those who wrote about them after them, especially after the emergence of written books that we have in abundance, except to be narrators of historical facts for those after us. Even if we dispense with being narrators from others, we presented them from those who lived through those events and perceived them from the men of the tribes.
Then the author continues discussing the events that took place in the Jibali tribes, saying: "Colonel Silvestre does not accept dialogue with El Raisuli regarding the methods of intrigue, but he falls under the influence of the militants of the Jibali tribes, who appear to him in the guise of religious fanatics who believe that Jihad is a complement to their religion, and that whoever is killed in the wars, his soul is snatched by the angels to where eternal bliss is found. Therefore, El Raisuli or the Muslim soldier sees that there is no solution to the problem between him and the Spanish soldier except through the fire coming out of rifle barrels, because the Spanish soldier returns to his proper place; for everything other than that is considered void and there is no hope for those behind him."
Is this mockery of Muslims from the sons of his homeland and those who placed him or the position of Spanish enemies, and he is a narrator from them? Thus he continues in reviewing this information transmitted from the ordinary Spanish politicians, who manufactured it as they wished, and wove it according to...
- Military Campaigns and Battles of El Raisuli and the Jibali Tribes (1919–1920)
...how they wanted, and did not believe in it or take it for granted by free men, so how could he undertake translating it from them with complete honesty without feeling that it is a specific weapon of the enemy, and leaving it for us after the end of his country and his absence from our eyes, then placing it in the throat of a free Moroccan and Moroccan nationalist fleeing from the yoke of foreign enemy and his colonization? Then he moves on to talk about the policy of Khardana, representative of the General Residency in Tetouan, saying: "After he was able to settle in the General Residency, he entered into negotiations with El Raisuli, through the Spanish Consul in Larache, Skawasti, and its conclusion ended with the Spanish Minister in Tangier, and this resulted in the freeze of military operations between Tetouan, Tangier, Asilah, Larache, and Ksar El Kebir, without the Spaniards relinquishing the positions that were militarily occupied during the era of Generals Al-Faw and General Chوسي مارینا (Jose Marina). As negotiations resulted in terms for a truce from El Raisuli, those terms are summarized as follows:
- That the Spanish Government pays financial compensation estimated at one and a half million of the simple losses of the war left by the Spanish war on the Moroccan side.
- That Spain provide the Moroccan side with a quantity of Mauser rifles with ammunition, estimated at five hundred rifles, and the agreement was signed to be handed over in the Souk Al-Kholot division of the Banu Jarfot tribe.
- The Spaniards must withdraw from the occupied places to their bases in the cities.
Then he made up weird things that sound reason would not accept, as is his habit: making El Raisuli appear in the disgraceful appearance before his enemies the Spaniards, as if he is fighting the people of the Rif, and he was not fighting our enemies and the enemies of the occupiers that make the author consider them as loyal friends, or paternal uncles and relatives in their loyalty, and showing blatant enmity towards leader El Raisuli, and that he is one of the sons of his homeland defending the honor of religion and the pride of the homeland, as he continued in presenting events.
He talked about General Dama Superiticker, who came as a successor to Khardana the deceased, at the beginning of Shawwal in the year 1338 AH corresponding to August 25, 1919 AD. Following his handover of the defunct, he divided the military command into two halves, making the military authority center one of them under the military supervision of Tetouan, and the other in Larache under the command of Colonel Silvestre, after he came from the city of Melilla. Following his assumption of the duties of the Larache command, he sent an ultimatum to El Raisuli, setting a short deadline for him to answer him regarding the agreement concluded between him and General Khardana...
- The Fierce Engagements: Spanish Offensives and Tribal Resistance in Northern Morocco
...which includes the surrender of the tribes to him without bloodshed. After the expiration of the ultimatum, it would be free in the occupation of the tribes by military force. After the end of the ultimatum, El Raisuli answered with rejection of what was agreed upon, then battles resumed all along the line of Ksar El Kebir to Tetouan, and for a full year battles were ongoing and at their fiercest against the occupying enemy, and the unified leadership from the outskirts of Tetouan to the city of Ksar El Kebir.
It was under the leadership of Dar bin Quraish, the hero Mujahid Hamid Walad Hmidou Al-Kharraz, and fighting began with the Spanish army along Wadi Al-Mahnash, and the blood of the Spanish army flowed in it like rivers, and the Mujahideen took refuge in the hills and heights, and their horses were from Gorghiz the ancient, Al-Azim rocks, and deep ravines. Crossing was impossible except for men and money, and the Spanish army did not cross the valley bridge except after heavy losses in men and military equipment. The youth of the tribes were trained in guerrilla warfare, and they managed to fight and inflict the heaviest losses on the occupying enemy. "Ask Qaid Al-Siba'i who is still alive"—for the battle became dearer to him than drinking cold water to a thirsty person. The Anjra tribe was of strategic location excellent between Ceuta, Tangier, and Tetouan, in solidarity with the tribes of Al-Hawz and Wadrass, and its location helped it on the rear front. Communications were severed between Tetouan and Tangier via the new Al-Fundaq road where El Raisuli's Mahalla was stationed, and at that point, the Anjra tribe turned into an arena for battles with the occupying enemy, where its brave youth competed after arming themselves with Spanish Mauser rifles and training in guerrilla warfare and combat methods under the leadership of loyal men, and descending upon the intruder with heavy losses in men, money, and military equipment, especially in that famous battle in the valley plain, which created panic and terror alongside the general command of the occupying army. It did not care about the enemy's thunderbolts that it sent upon them by land and sea, helping its high ridges, deep ravines, and winding paths to achieve those brilliant victories; so that it left the enemy no rest or breathing room, then the Spanish enemy changed his military policy and returned to buying consciences, to the rest of what preceded.
Then the policy of division in the fighting tribe advanced from the direction of Ceuta and from the direction of Tangier, so the breach widened on the horizon, and the policy of Jihad retreated backwards in the tribe, and the enemy was able to coordinate the first communications between Ceuta and Tangier via the small Ksar road...
- From Ain Al-Fundaq to Banu Arus: The Turning Points of Northern Resistance
...the Strait, then the lifting of the ban that was imposed on the enemy by this tribe fighting it; the first affected some other tribes than the Mujahideen at the end of the occupation \langle And God knows best before and after \rangle.
After Berenguer divided his command into two commands: the command of Tetouan under his orders, supervised by himself, and assigned the command of Larache to Colonel Silvestre. Likewise, the leader El Raisuli divided the Mahalla of Dar bin Quraish into five commands: and assigned 1) to the leader Muhammad walad Hmidou Al-Harraz, his agency in the Rabat center at Ain Al-Fundaq Al-Jadida, and assigned four commands to each of the heroes of the combatants: 2) Leader الطالب محمد بن حازم (Talib Muhammad bin Hazim), to the Anjra tribe, 3) Leader Sidi Abd al-Salam Al-Harrouti, to the Banu Hozmar tribe, 4) Leader Sidi Ahmad al-Tawil, to the Hawz tribe, 5) Leader Sidi al-Arabi bin Halima, to the Banu Yder tribe. Command of Arba'a Aiyacha was assigned to Leader Muhammad walad Al-Hajj Al-Mujahid Al-Talibi, and Three Rissana to Leader Moulay Ahmad Al-Samawi Al-Rissouni. In this Japan, the Banu Arus tribe was visited by a rural relief composed of eight hundred Mujahids formed from the Sanhaja tribes by order of Sharif Sidi Ahmed Al-Wazzani in his capacity, and among them was Professor Al-Arabi Al-Luh who spoke in his book about the details of its failure and its return to its country safely.
And years passed over Berenguer's war, which was assisted by ground, aerial, and industrial forces, and the ground men stood firm in it as much as possible; but the enemy was overwhelmingly superior with artillery and aviation. In the middle of Sha'ban in the year 1338 AH corresponding to June 25, 1920 AD, the enemy occupied the center of the Mujahideen in the village of Dar bin Quraish. Then the invading Moroccan forces consisting of the police or the soldiers of the column advanced invading the tribes on their way to Chefchaouen, and then the General Resident requested more Spanish forces and military and combat supplies from the Madrid government, and his government assisted him with military and combat supplies. Another force followed from the sea, headed by Colonel Al-Jabbas, and occupied Wadi Lou, and some Ghomara tribes occupied and exploited some of their tribes to the policy of Spain, so the Mujahideen rebelled against the Spanish policy, and sided with the support of the Spanish army. In this period, General Berenguer took over the General Residency, distributing the occupation armies, occupying the center of Ain Al-Fundaq Al-Jadida after crushing battles, and then another army for the occupation of Jabal Rghiz. On June 25, 1920 AD, the Mujahideen center of Dar bin Quraish was occupied after crushing battles between them in which many of the leaders of the Mujahideen were martyred, and then the enemy continued his advance...
...Leader Walad Hmidou Al-Kharraz, and the Mujahideen fled to take refuge in Jabal Al-Ilm, and Leader Muhammad bin Hazim settled in Mudshar Tilia, and Leader Ahmad Al-Akhir fled to the fortress village with his children, as well as Leader Sidi Ahmad Al-Tawil, and Al-Sayyid Al-Arabi bin Halima, and Leader Sidi Abd al-Salam Al-Harrati, and others, from the men of the occupied tribes.
From the western front, Colonel Silvestre carried out a wide-scale campaign preceded by aviation, heavy and light artillery, and all infernal means.
On August 28, 1920 AD, the Aqba of Qala was occupied for the first time from the direction of Ksar El Kebir, then a movement was made in the heart of the Banu Yusuf tribe, and another wide-scale campaign was made on the Banu Arus tribe, meeting fierce resistance in its path. Then it occupied a center in Al-Sarja or Kodyat Al-Aamrouj, where it met fierce resistance from the men of the tribes via Wadi Asaq, then advanced slightly for about three miles, and occupied Rakbat Al-Ghazal in the fields of Banu Arus and Banu Yder, where it made Wadi Asaq an inch-by-inch trench until it reached Bab Al-Sour. Then another force advanced from the direction of Samata via Souq Sebt Banu Jarfot in terrifying horrors in confrontation with the ruin of Samata, at a village called Al-Nawadir, near Mudshar Maysara. Wadi Asaq forces also advanced after fierce fighting and occupied Bab Al-Sour, making it a strategic center to guard the Wadi Asaq road in front of the garrison of Al-Nawadir near Mudshar Maysara. Those forces advanced slightly in the face of strong and fierce resistance in which the men of the Banu Arus, Samata, and Banu Yder tribes participated, and they ignited nationalist fire, then descended and stationed themselves at a place called Al-Sifriya, which overlooks Khamis Banu Arus, where there remained between it and the occupation forces about eight miles. The fatalities among these accumulated occupation centers in the various fronts around which the wheels of fierce resistance revolved were numerous, and what vanquished the Mujahideen forces was the air force, as it flew over the Mujahideen at a low altitude, hunting them down one by one while they were hiding in the burning forests, until it could strike them from above with machine guns after the explosion of incendiary bombs. Due to the aviation weapon, the enemy armies were able to advance and slice through the lands, then many armies emerged from the city of Ksar El Kebir, heading on their way to occupy Khamis Banu Arus, and made their way to the Banu Yusuf tribe and participated with the stationed armies at the base,...Al-Qala. The occupation armies stationed along the Wadi Asaq road marched forward after the leadership supplied them with massive military reinforcements. The other forces advanced via the Banu Yusuf road and met with the Wadi Asaq forces at Souq Khamis Banu Arus in the year 1338 AH corresponding to 1920 AD. Thus, the occupation forces triumphed over the tribal men after the steadfast Mujahideen demonstrated all they could of sacrifice and combat. The occupation of Souq Khamis Banu Arus aimed to encircle El Raisuli and the centers of Jihad in the village of Tazroute, marking the grand finale of the occupation.
"This is how historian Al-Hajj Al-Bouayachi narrated and analyzed these events from his historical perspective, documenting the fierce confrontations and the unfolding chapters of resistance in northern Morocco."
See the first chapter linked below
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